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Introduction 
     The year may not be 1984, but concerns of Big Brother-style surveillance have not   
ceased.  One such concern stems from a topic that has received a great deal of recent 
attention from consumers, media, government and industry officials alike.  The topic is 
online behavioral advertising, which the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines as 
“the practice of tracking an individual’s online activities in order to deliver advertising 
tailored to the individual’s interests” (2007, December 20).   Online behavioral 
advertising has become one of, if not the, key component of marketing in the digital age, 
and the topic has peaked the interests and efforts of the advertising community, while 
garnering equal concern and criticism from privacy rights and advocacy groups. 
    In June 2010, The Wall Street Journal published the results of an investigative study 
analyzing the tracking methods employed by the 50-most visited U.S. websites.  The 
results were documented on the paper’s website and presented as an interactive 
multimedia graphic detailing the number of tracking devices for individual websites and 
presenting the privacy policies outlined by the respective sites. 
     Based on the study, The Wall Street Journal published an ongoing series titled “What 
They Know.” It covered industry, government and legal developments related to online 
behavioral advertising as well as opinions and feedback on the topic.  According to an 
informal readers poll conducted as part of the “What They Know” series, nearly 60% of 
respondents indicated that they were “Very alarmed” by advertisers and companies 
tracking their behavior across the Web (Wall Street Journal, 2011). 
     With such ongoing attention given to this hot button issue, it is worth taking account 
of the developments surrounding online behavioral advertising in recent years.  This 
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paper will detail the technology used in online behavioral advertising and survey the 
landscape of voices and opinions that have grown up around its use.  Court cases, 
government regulation and industry practices will all be examined in an effort to produce 
a set of best practices to be considered for future advancements in online behavioral 
advertising.  Finally, the paper will offer suggestions for further advancing self-regulation 
among the advertising industry as a way of reserving government regulation as a last 
resort. 
What is Online Behavioral Advertising? 
     Most websites regularly offer content free of charge.  The user does not pay a 
subscription or fee, so the content is, instead, paid for by advertising.  These sites are 
known to advertisers as “publishers,” and make certain portions of their page space 
available to display ads. 
     According to the Center for Democracy and Technology, publisher sites sell the space 
on their pages to “marketers, ad agencies, or online ad networks that place advertisements 
into the space” (2008, July 31).  In addition to purchasing ad space, these intermediaries 
may also make arrangements with a website to collect information about the site’s 
visitors, allowing them to track the visitors’ behavior and, therefore cater the 
advertisements they display.  In the context of these agreements, “a consumer’s computer 
connects to one or more ad networks to communicate data about the consumer’s visit and 
receive advertising on the site” (2008, July 31).   
     The ad networks act as a sort of middleman between publishers and advertisers, 
collecting information about visitors on the publisher sites on the one hand and collecting 
information about advertisers on the other.  Based on a visitor’s behavior, the ad 
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networks pull from the advertisements available in their network and then display the 
ones they believe will be most relevant to the individual in question. 
     The two most widely used methods ad networks employ to place advertisements are 
“contextual” advertising and “behavioral” advertising.  Unlike behavioral advertising, 
contextual ads do not take into account the behavior or actions of an individual user or 
site visitor.  Instead, contextual advertising is based on the content of a website.  For 
example, a website about music news might display an ad for tickets to an upcoming 
concert. 
     In contrast, behavioral advertising, as the name suggests, is based entirely on the 
actions and behavior of an individual, placing ads in relation to a consumer’s interests, as 
they are determined over a period of time.  Ads do not have to relate to the content of the 
page on which they appear.  Instead, the ad network may notice that a user has made 
searches relating to music before visiting a news website about current events.  While no 
music news exists on the current events news page, an ad for concert tickets might still 
appear based on the user’s previous search behavior.  The Center for Democracy and 
Technology explains, “a traditional behavioral ad network assembles profiles of 
individual consumers by tracking users’ activities on publisher sites within their network.  
When the consumer visits a site where the ad network has purchased ad space, the ad 
network collects data about that visit while serving an advertisement based on the 
consumer’s profile” (2008, July 31).  
     The act of tracking user behavior to generate relevant ads happens in two distinct 
ways.  The first and most basic way is through “first-party” or “intra-site” collection.  
This refers to a single website’s use of an individual’s personal information to generate 
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tailored content based on previous search patterns and does not include the presence of an 
outside ad network.  The collection of the individual’s data most often takes place 
through the use of cookies, “a small piece of text that is saved on a computer and 
retrieved when the user revisits the site” (Lilke, 2009, p. 11).  A unique cookie ID is 
deposited the first time a user visits a site.  The cookie then tracks the user’s information, 
including how long the individual stays on a particular page and what items the 
individual views.  All the information collected about the individual is attributed to that 
user’s unique ID and stored in a database.  According to Lilke, “when the individual 
returns to the site, the user’s browser automatically sends the individual’s cookie back to 
the site.  From here, the site looks up the cookie ID in its database and serves the user 
product recommendations and ads based on previous behaviors” (2009, p. 11).   
     In contrast to first-party advertising, behavioral tracking also occurs through “third-
party” advertising.  Rather than collecting information from a single site, third-party 
advertising tracks behavior across multiple sites and includes the presence of an outside, 
or “third-party” ad network.  In this scenario, the ad network acts as a third party by 
collecting the data tracked by first-party sites within its network.  The first-party sites 
collect user data in the fashion described above and then sell that information to the third-
party ad network.  When this is the case, the third-party ad network can compile a 
broader picture of the individual user and generate ads based on that user’s general 
behavior across a number of sites, rather than the user’s specific behavior from an 
individual site.  For example, a first-party site may notice that a user has been looking at 
information for Toyota Corollas and believe the user is interested in buying that specific 
car.  A third-party ad network, on the other hand, can see through its participating sites 
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that the same user also looked at Nissan Maximas on another site and Ford Tauruses on 
yet another.  Therefore, based on the user’s general behavior, the third-party ad network 
can then tell that the user is likely in the market for a new sedan, while the first-party site 
only knows the user has been looking at specific cars and may think he is in the market 
for a only one brand or model. 
     Third-party advertising and tracking has been the cause of many consumer concerns 
and complaints.  While consumers can reasonably infer that an individual website has 
access to their behavior while on the site, it is not as obvious that additional parties might 
also have access to their information.  In the following section, two legal case studies are 
provided as examples of concerns raised by consumers over such third-party tracking and 
advertising.  These accounts will help provide real world examples of how tracking 
occurs and why consumers are so deeply bothered by the thought of outside parties 
accessing their personal information. 
Legal Case Studies 
     In a November 6, 2007 press release, Facebook announced, “44 websites are using 
Facebook Beacon to allow users to share information from other websites for distribution 
to their friends on Facebook.”  The program, designed to combine the social networking 
efforts of Facebook and the 44 affiliate sites, allowed users’ actions from the outside 
websites to be published to their individual Facebook profiles and news feeds.  In the 
same press release, Facebook noted, “Beacon is a core element of the Facebook Ads 
system for connecting businesses with users and targeting advertising to the audiences 
they want” (2007, November 6).  Both Facebook and the businesses involved intended to 
use the Beacon program to enhance their behavioral advertising efforts. 
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     In theory, the Beacon program sounded harmless enough.  In fact, it seemed in line 
with what Facebook was already doing, in that it allowed users to share personal 
information with other users in their network.  Where Facebook failed in launching the 
new program, was in its disclosure of privacy standards and participation requests for 
Beacon.  From the period of November 6, 2007, when the program launched, to roughly a 
month later, on December 5, 2007, default settings for the Beacon program were 
designed as an “opt out” platform.  In other words, unless Facebook users indicated they 
did not want to participate in the Beacon program, they were automatically enrolled. 
     The result of these nontransparent settings was a class action lawsuit filed against 
Facebook and Facebook Beacon’s 44 affiliate sites in the Northern District of California 
on August, 12, 2008.  According to the complaint: 
Facebook and the Facebook Beacon Activated Affiliates acted both independently 
and jointly in that they knowingly authorized, directed, ratified, approved, 
acquiesced, or participated by accessing and disclosing the personal information 
(“PI”) and/or personal identifying information (“PPI”) derived from the activity of 
the Facebook member which had accessed the website of Facebook Beacon 
Activated Affiliate, without authority or consent of the Facebook member (Lane 
v. Facebook, Inc., 2008). 
In short, Facebook and the affiliated sites published private information about Facebook 
users without the knowledge or consent of those users.  In a particularly telling example, 
Facebook user Sean Lane purchased a ring from Overstock.com as a present to his wife.  
As soon as the transaction was completed, its details (including the 51 percent discount 
Lane received) were published to the user’s Facebook wall and news feed.  As a result, 
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Lane’s friends, co-workers, acquaintances and wife saw that he had purchased the ring 
(Mullin, 2010, April 14). 
     The class action suit concluded that in order to change the default privacy settings of 
their accounts at the time of Beacon’s launch, users like Lane would have to, “read 
interpret and select nine separate tabs displaying privacy options.”  Put another way, “the 
Facebook user would be obligated to read approximately 4 pages and 2,283 words in 
order to permit access only to their selected friends” (Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2008).  In 
the current example, Lane would not only have had to find the time to sneak away long 
enough to select and purchase a gift for his wife, but also to find the additional time to 
read a privacy statement the length of an instruction manual and then change his privacy 
settings accordingly, all in order to keep the gift a secret. 
     The class action complaint filed against Facebook Beacon cited more than just the 
program’s “opt out” setting as a problem.  One such problem was that information about 
individuals using Facebook Beacon’s affiliated sites was transmitted to Facebook, 
regardless of whether or not those individuals were Facebook members.  Unlike 
Facebook users who had the option of reading through privacy settings, “non-Facebook 
persons who utilized the Facebook Beacon Activated Affiliate websites were not told that 
their transaction, and indeed, every transaction they engaged in on the website was being 
communicated to a third party (Facebook) with whom they had no relationship 
whatsoever” (Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2008).   
     Even in the case of Facebook users, individuals were not notified of their information 
being transmitted to a third party until after the information had been sent.  According to 
the complaint, attempts to gain users’ consent were, “inadequate, uninformed, 
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misleading, untimely, and deceptive” (Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2008).  The inadequacy of 
the attempts to gain consent stemmed from the fact that, when the attempts were present 
at all, they occurred in the form of pop-up windows, appearing for roughly 10 seconds or 
less.  The attempts were uninformed in that they did not explain or specify the details of 
“how, which, or through what means” the user’s information was being transmitted from 
the affiliate site to Facebook.  Attempts were misleading because their nature implied that 
users had some control over the exchange of information when, in reality, such control 
was not an option.  The untimely nature of the attempts was due to the fact that 
information had already been transmitted by the time users were made aware of what was 
happening.  Finally the attempts to gain user consent were deceptive because, in most 
instances, the sharing of user information between Facebook and the affiliated sites was 
contrary to the privacy policies of Facebook and the affiliate sites alike. 
     Nearly a month after Beacon’s release, a statement was issued by Facebook founder 
Mark Zuckerberg admitting that company had erred in its release of the program.  
Speaking on behalf of Facebook, Zuckerberg explained, “we’ve made a lot of mistakes 
building this feature, but we’ve made even more with how we’ve handled them.  We 
simply did a bad job with this release and I apologize for it” (2007, December 5).  
Zuckerberg went on to further explain Facebook’s original intentions behind the Beacon 
program, including the fact that the goal was to provide people with a way to easily share 
information across sites with friends.  In his explanation, Zuckerberg noted that the 
problem with Facebook’s efforts was their lack of transparency, which resulted from their 
desire to make the platform as lightweight as possible.  The lightweight nature of the 
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platform was supposed to avoid making the act of sharing information too cumbersome, 
but instead, it simply made the sharing that took place deceptive.  
     On September 17, 2009, the class action suit against Facebook and the Beacon 
affiliates came to an end when the plaintiffs filed a settlement agreement.  The agreement 
called for a settlement fund of $9.5 million, from which up to $3 million was to be used 
for administrative costs and attorneys’ fees.  Also from the fund, the 19 representative 
plaintiffs received monetary sums based on the amount of money they contributed during 
the duration of the case.  With what was left of the $9.5 million, Facebook was ordered to 
use to establish a nonprofit Privacy Foundation “to fund projects and initiatives that 
promote the cause of online privacy, safety, and security” (Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 2008).  
The settlement was approved by Judge Richard Seeborg of the U.S. District Court for the 
Northern District of California on March 17, 2010. 
     Just months after the lawsuit against Facebook Beacon was filed, a class action suit 
was filed against the online advertising company NebuAd and at least six NebuAd 
Activated ISP Affiliates (NAISPs) on November 10, 2008.  At the time, NebuAd’s 
business model was built on the development of behavioral advertising through 
partnerships with ISPs that allowed NebuAd access to their customers’ web surfing 
habits.  The goal, as with Facebook Beacon and other online behavioral advertising 
companies, was to provide individual web users with targeted, relevant advertising.   
     There was, however, a significant difference between NebuAd and Facebook’s 
Beacon program.  While Beacon relied on the use of cookies to track and share user 
behavior, NebuAd relied on a tactic called “deep packet inspection.”  In a Washington 
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Post article, Rob Pegoraro provided a practical analogy to describe the difference 
between the two tactics: 
Tracking via cookies is the rough equivalent of a supermarket clerk noting that 
you spend a lot of time in Aisle 9 checking out cereal but never duck into Aisle 2 
for frozen dinners.  Deep packet inspection, by contrast, is more like the clerk 
following you to see which boxes of cereal you eyeballed – and doing so at every 
store you visit, even those run by other companies (2008). 
While Facebook and the Beacon affiliates tracked and shared the general behavior of web 
users on select, participating sites, NebuAd signed on with ISPs to track every move 
Internet users made while surfing the web and then provided advertising based on those 
specific actions. 
     Similar to the Facebook Beacon case, the complaint against NebuAd and the NAISPs 
alleged:  
NebuAd and the NAISPs acted both independently and jointly, in that they 
knowingly authorized, directed, ratified, approved acquiesced, or participated by 
accessing and disclosing sensitive information (“SI”), personal identifying 
information (“PII”), personal information (“PI”), and non-personal identifying 
information (“Non-PII”) derived from the intentional interception of the NAISP 
subscriber’s online transmissions, without authority or consent of the NAISP 
subscriber (Valentine v. NebuAd, Inc., 2008). 
According to the complaint, the actions performed through the joint venture between 
NebuAd and the NAISPs were not based on a normal course of business, but instead, 
were intended to monetize subscribers’ data for advertisement purposes.  In a normal 
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course of business, ISPs have a right to inspect a subscriber’s datastream for reasons like 
viruses, spam, securing the network or policing bandwidth, but using deep packet 
inspection to produce advertising content does not fall within those rights. 
     Also similar to the actions of Facebook’s Beacon program was NebuAd’s default “opt 
out” setting.  If NebuAd had a contract with a user’s ISP, the user was automatically 
enrolled in the NebuAd service.  According to the complaint against NebuAd, there were 
no cases in which users were given adequate or informed notice of the true nature of the 
service.  In instances where some type of notice of NebuAd’s services was given, the 
notice was “insufficient, misleading, and inadequate” (Valentine v. NebuAd, Inc., 2008).  
Even in cases where users were provided with an “opt out” function, their data was still 
collected and the only change made was to the provision of advertisements during their 
web experience.  In the same way that Facebook Beacon collected information about 
non-Facebook users, NebuAd still collected information about users that had chosen not 
to receive the company’s advertisements. 
     In an act suggesting the company knew it could no longer operate in its intended form, 
a document was filed in the class action suit on May 17, 2009 explaining that NebuAd 
would be closing its services.  According to the document, NebuAd claimed it would 
“cease to exist as on ongoing concern” and that it was assigning all assets to its creditors.  
In the document, NebuAd further asserted, “from a company that once employed over 60 
people, NebuAd now operates with a skeleton staff, and shortly, that too will disappear.  
At the time the document was filed, a news story from Ars Technica explained that the 
company had intended to attempt a news business model, “but the money wasn’t there to 
continue, it appears, and the company is gone” (Anderson, 2009, May 19). 
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     Concerns similar to those raised by the plaintiffs in the above cases are common 
among consumers and a large number of privacy groups and organizations, such as the 
Center for Digital Democracy, Consumer Federation of America, Electronic Frontier 
Foundation and U.S. Public Interest Research Group.  As a result, legislators and 
government officials have been seeking solutions to ease these concerns and protect the 
interest of Internet users.  The following section examines some of the recent efforts 
made by the U.S. government to regulate the online advertising industry and develop 
useful solutions for protecting online privacy. 
Government Regulation 
     In 2010, two separate pieces of legislation were introduced to address the online 
privacy rights of American consumers.  In July, U. S. Rep. Bobby L. Rush, chairman of 
the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, introduced a bill titled 
“The Best Practices Act of 2010.”  Drafted after a series of joint hearings with the 
Subcommittee on Communications, Internet, and Technology, which looked into the 
issue of consumer privacy, Rush’s bill sought to achieve a balance between privacy rights 
and industry incentives.  In a press release, Rush’s staff concluded the bill “establishes a 
flexible framework of basic rights for consumers while also outlining obligations for 
companies based on fair information principles” (Jenkins & Gadlin, July 19, 2010).  
Following are some of the key provisions included in the proposed legislation: 
• Ensure that consumers have meaningful choices about the collection, use, and 
disclosure of their personal information. 
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• Require companies that collect personal information to disclose their practices 
with respect to the collection, use disclosure, merging, and retention of personal 
information, and explain consumers’ options regarding those practices. 
• Require companies to provide disclosures of their practices in concise, 
meaningful, timely, and easy-to-understand notices, and direct the Federal Trade 
Commission to establish flexible and reasonable standards and requirements for 
such notices.  
• Require companies to obtain "opt-in" consent to disclose information to a third 
party.  In the bill, the term, "third party" would be defined based on consumers' 
reasonable expectations rather than corporate structure.  
• Waive the "opt-in" consent requirement, for companies choosing to participate in 
a universal opt-out program operated by self-regulatory bodies and monitored by 
FTC.  
• Require companies to have reasonable procedures to assure the accuracy of the 
personal information they collect.  The bill would also require the companies to 
provide consumers with reasonable access to, and the ability to correct or amend, 
certain information.  
• Require companies to have reasonable procedures to secure information and to 
retain personal information only as long as is necessary to fulfill a legitimate 
business or law enforcement need (Jenkins & Gadlin, July 19, 2010). 
 Rush’s bill did not come to a vote during the 2010 Congressional session, but Rush 
announced in October that he had gained the support of three industry leaders – eBay, 
Intel and Microsoft.  In a letter to the representative, the companies announced, “We 
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support the bill’s overall framework, which is built upon the Fair Information Practices 
regime.  We appreciate that the Best Practices Act is technology neutral and gives 
flexibility to the Federal Trade Commission to adapt to the changes in technology” 
(Jenkins & Gadlin, October, 7, 2010).  The companies also expressed their approval of 
the bill’s provision to allow businesses the opportunity to enter into a robust self-
regulatory choice program.  Acting on the end-of-year momentum, Rush re-introduced 
the legislation in February 2011 and continues to search for additional support for the 
bill. 
 Before Rush’s Best Practices Act, Rep. Rick Boucher proposed his own legislation in 
the form of a “discussion” draft on May 4, 2010.  Boucher’s proposal would have 
mandated the length of time consumer information could be retained online and, similar 
to the Rush bill, required that websites gain consumers’ consent before sharing their data 
for marketing purposes.  Unlike Rush’s Best Practices Act, however, the Boucher 
proposal garnered harsh criticism from consumer groups and conservatives alike.  
Consumers argued the bill was not strong enough on limiting the time information could 
be stored, while conservative groups argued the bill went too far.  In a statement released 
by the Progress and Freedom Foundation, the organization claimed:  
By mandating a hodgepodge of restrictive regulatory defaults, policymakers could 
unintentionally devastate the ‘free’ Internet as we know it.  Because the digital 
economy is fueled by advertising and data collection, a privacy industrial policy 
for the Internet would diminish consumer choice in ad-supported content and 
services, raise prices, quash digital innovation, and hurt online speech platforms 
enjoyed by Internet users worldwide” (Kravitz, 2010). 
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Boucher’s bill, like Rush’s, never came to fruition during the 2010 Congressional 
session and the complaints surrounding the bill illustrated the caution and balance such 
regulation would require.  Boucher went on to lose in the November 2010 election and, 
consequently, his privacy efforts ended with his unsuccessful campaign.  
     Shortly after the 2010 elections, one of the most notable government efforts to 
secure online privacy rights came on December 1, 2010 when the FTC released a staff 
report recommending specific practices to insure the protection of online consumers.  
In addition to addressing concerns about educating consumers and fears surrounding 
practices like deep packet inspection, the report set forth the recommendation of a “Do 
Not Track” mechanism that could be installed in all Internet browsers.  The mechanism 
was the FTC’s attempt at a blanket approach to addressing consumer protection and 
was developed based on the popular Do Not Call registry that currently governs the 
telemarketing industry.   
     According to the report, “Such a mechanism would ensure that consumers would 
not have to exercise choices on a company-by-company or industry-by-industry basis, 
and that such choices would be persistent” (FTC, 2010).  The Do Not Track tool would 
be established either by legislation or, as the report explained, by “robust, enforceable 
self-regulation” by advertisers and Web companies.  Once established, the mechanism 
would most likely exist as a persistent cookie on users’ browsers that communicates 
with websites to establish that a user does not want to be tracked or receive targeted 
advertising (Kang, 2010).   
     While coming up with its Do Not Track recommendation, the commission noted 
that it sought to balance consumer concerns for privacy and business interests 
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regarding targeted advertising.  The FTC explained, “in developing the proposed 
framework, staff was cognizant of the need to protect consumer privacy interests 
effectively, while also encouraging the development of innovative new products and 
services that consumers want” (Federal Trade Commission, 2010).  Such awareness of 
the balancing act required by regulation efforts suggested that the FTC was more 
sensitive to the needs of both consumers and advertisers than Rep. Boucher was in his 
own proposal earlier that year. 
     If the FTC’s proposed Do Not Track mechanism is eventually adopted it would 
affect more than just the interests of consumers and advertisers.  Internet software 
providers would be deeply impacted by the proposal, as it would be the responsibility 
of companies that design Internet browsers to develop and maintain the Do Not Track 
tool.  Microsoft and Mozilla have each expressed support for the FTC proposal since 
the staff report was released, with Microsoft going as far as developing and releasing a 
version of the Do Not Track tool in its most recent version of Internet Explorer.  While 
Mozilla has not yet released its own version, it announced in January that it would 
include a do-not-track feature in its upcoming version of the Firefox browser 
(Wingfield & Angwin, 2011, March 15).  At this point, Google and Apple are the only 
large providers of Internet browsers that have not yet announced their support. 
     Finally, the most recent move by the government to endorse consumer privacy came 
on March 16, 2011 when the Obama administration expressed its desire for Congress 
to pass a “privacy bill of rights” that would protect Americans from intrusive data 
gathering.  In a written testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee, Assistant 
Commerce Secretary Lawrence Strickling said, “The administration urges Congress to 
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enact a ‘consumer privacy bill of rights’ to provide baseline consumer data privacy 
protections” (Engleman, 2011, March 16).  Strickling explained that the legislation 
should give the FTC authority to enforce privacy protections and take action against 
noncompliant advertisers.  Such outspoken involvement from the current 
administration is a change from the previous hands-off approach previous 
administrations took towards the Internet and clearly demonstrates the administration’s 
concern for consumers as it reassesses the federal government’s role in regulating 
online tracking.  Strickling’s statements will most likely produce additional support for 
the re-introduction of Rep. Rush’s legislation as well as provide momentum to privacy 
legislation that is currently being drafted by Sen. John Kerry. 
     While the government continues to develop its strategies for protecting consumers, 
the advertising industry has been hard at work producing its own solutions for 
regulating Internet tracking.  The following section examines these solutions and 
outlines the recent steps the industry has taken in developing its own self-regulatory 
programs. 
Industry Self-Regulation 
     In efforts to avoid government regulation, the advertising industry has come 
together to work collectively at developing a system of self-regulation.  The industry’s 
efforts came to fruition in July 2009 when the American Association of Advertising 
Agencies, the Association of National Advertisers, the Council of Better Business 
Bureaus, the Direct Marketing Association and the Interactive Advertising Bureau 
collectively released their “Self Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral 
Advertising.”  The industry leaders developed the principles based on tenets the FTC 
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had released earlier the same year and designed them to address consumer concerns 
about the use of personal information while protecting their own interest in advancing 
innovations within the advertising community.  The effort consisted of the following 
seven self-regulatory principles: 
1. The Education Principle calls for organizations to participate in efforts to 
educate individuals and businesses about online behavioral advertising and the 
Principles. 
2. The Transparency Principle calls for clearer and easily accessible 
disclosures to consumers about data collection and use practices associated 
with online behavioral advertising. It would result in new, enhanced notice on 
the page where data is collected through links embedded in or around 
advertisements, or on the Web page itself. 
3. The Consumer Control Principle provides consumers with an expanded 
ability to choose whether data is collected and used for online behavioral 
advertising purposes. This choice will be available through a link from the 
notice provided on the Web page where data is collected.  The Consumer 
Control Principle requires "service providers" … to obtain the consent of 
users before engaging in online behavioral advertising, and take steps to de-
identify the data used for such purposes. 
4. The Data Security Principle calls for organizations to provide appropriate 
security for, and limited retention of data, collected and used for online 
behavioral advertising purposes. 
  
19 
5. The Material Changes Principle calls for obtaining consumer consent before 
a Material Change is made to an entity's Online Behavioral Advertising data 
collection and use policies unless that change will result in less collection or 
use of data. 
6. The Sensitive Data Principle recognizes that data collected from children 
and used for online behavioral advertising merits heightened protection, and 
requires parental consent for behavioral advertising to consumers known to be 
under 13 on child-directed Web sites. This Principle also provides heightened 
protections to certain health and financial data when attributable to a specific 
individual. 
7. The Accountability Principle calls for development of programs to further 
advance these Principles, including programs to monitor and report instances 
of uncorrected non-compliance with these Principles to appropriate 
government agencies. The CBBB and DMA have been asked and agreed to 
work cooperatively to establish accountability mechanisms under the 
Principles (Digital Advertising Alliance, 2009). 
     In October 2010, a little more than a year after the release of the principles, the 
participating organizations, along with a handful of additional industry groups, 
announced the creation of a coalition offering a “Self-Regulatory Program for Online 
Behavioral Advertising.”  The coalition, named the Digital Advertising Alliance, opened 
a registration platform through their website wwww.aboutads.info allowing any 
advertiser to sign up and become a part of the self-policing program.   
  
20 
     The Digital Advertising Alliance program requires participants to include an icon in 
the right-hand corner of ads that allows Internet users to click and receive information 
about the ad and who is serving it.  After clicking on the icon, users are able to follow 
links enabling them to opt out of being tracked by the advertiser and third-party data 
partners.  The annual fee for participating in the program is $5,000 for first-party 
companies and $10,000 for third parties (Lee, 2010, October 4). 
     In a display of commitment to the program, the Digital Advertising Alliance enlisted 
the support of the Council of Better Business Bureaus (CBBB) to administer its efforts.  
While the CBBB was listed as the enforcement arm of the program since the time of its 
inception, the council announced in March 2011 that it would be stepping up enforcement 
in order to make the efforts official.  In an interview with Ad Age, Eugenie Barton, the 
individual charged with heading up the enforcement efforts, explained, “for everybody 
who states they are in compliance, we will be checking to see if they are in compliance 
with the principles.  And if they’re not, we’ll be talking to them about what steps they are 
taking to be in compliance, and what they’re timeline is” (Lee, 2011, March 4). 
     According to Barton, if there is a dispute about a company’s compliance, the company 
will be monitored to determine whether or not they are displaying proper notices and 
offering functional opt-out links.  If, eventually, a company fails to comply with the 
principles, they will be referred to the “appropriate agency.”  In most cases, according to 
Barton, the agency will be the FTC. 
     The advertising industry’s efforts, along with the proposals of legislators and the U.S. 
government, all represent an acknowledgement of the fact that something should be done 
to regulate the use of online behavioral advertising.  The final section of this research 
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paper summarizes the some of the key takeaways of these efforts and offers a set of 
suggestions for moving forward with regulatory efforts and behavioral advertising 
practices in the future. 
Suggestions for Future Practices 
     As the Facebook and NebuAd lawsuits both show, one of the main issues to consider 
in relation to online behavioral advertising is transparency.  Consumers are clearly 
alarmed by the fact that third parties are tracking their online behavior, and hiding this 
fact only heightens their sense of concern.  Facebook and NebuAd both erred in 
deceptively collecting information about Internet users without their consent, and their 
behavior should serve as a warning sign to other advertisers as they move forward with 
their own efforts in the future.  
     It is a well-known fact that user information is collected by first-party tracking on 
individual websites.  However, in situations where third-party tracking occurs, websites 
and advertising companies should be upfront with users about what information is being 
collected or shared.  Unlike the failed Facebook Beacon program, Facebook’s newer 
Connect platform has seen broad acceptance from its users.  Connect, much like Beacon, 
allows Facebook users to share information about what they are doing on the Web with 
other users in their Facebook community.  The primary difference between the two 
programs has been Facebook’s willingness to disclose information to their users.  While 
Beacon shared information without adequate notice, Connect requests a user’s permission 
before sharing information between Facebook and third-party websites.  As Josh Catone 
put it at the time of Connect’s release, “by introducing user controlled privacy settings 
from the start and allowing any site to tap into Facebook’s user base via Connect, 
  
22 
Facebook has created the version of Beacon that they should have launched last fall” 
(2008, July 24).  Indeed, sharing information across platforms is not what concerns 
Internet users.  It is when their information is shared without knowledge or consent that 
users become alarmed. 
     In order to ease the alarm of consumers while simultaneously protecting the interests 
of the advertising industry, a set of regulatory practices is desirable.  Such regulation, 
however, poses a central question to the concerns surrounding online behavioral 
advertising.  Should government or industry control the regulatory efforts?  The question, 
unfortunately, does not have any easy answers.  At this point, the government has not 
formally passed any proper regulatory program and the self-regulating program created 
by the advertising industry is still in its infancy.  As such, neither effort can be adequately 
evaluated or accurately compared to the other and the argument for one option is 
potentially as viable as the next. 
     With that said, it is still necessary to develop a strategy for regulating behavioral 
advertising in order to protect the interests of all concerned parties.  Having researched 
both sides of the debate and weighing the options of each, this author believes that the 
industry should be given a chance at self-regulation before the government intervenes.  
As evidenced by the Facebook Connect example, the industry is clearly capable of 
reworking its structure to adequately address the concerns of consumers while further 
developing the technology behind behavioral advertising.  Through self-regulation, the 
industry could continue to advance its technology without fear of punishment or 
retribution, while simultaneously considering consumer concerns and government 
suggestions to maintain transparency and accountability. 
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     A primary industry concern regarding possible regulation is the fact that the FTC’s 
suggestions along with the efforts of legislators and the administration generally favor an 
opt-in approach to behavioral advertising.  This strategy, of course, would thoroughly 
protect consumers, but it would do so at the risk of stifling innovation among the 
advertising industry.  If all behavioral advertising is transitioned to an opt-in strategy, 
there is a very real possibility that the general consumer population could simply choose 
not to participate.  Such an act would be detrimental to the previous work of the 
advertising community, and it is therefore worth affording the industry the chance to alter 
its strategy in order to preserve the value of its work while observing the rights of 
consumers and considering the concerns of the government. 
     Indeed, the Digital Advertising Alliance’s “Self Regulatory Principles for Online 
Behavioral Advertising” show that the industry has taken government concerns into 
consideration by basing the principles on tenets outlined by the FTC.  Tellingly, the 
principles, published more than a year before the FTC’s official suggestion of a Do Not 
Track Tool, seemed to foreshadow such a mechanism, promoting some of the exact 
issues the tool seeks to address, such as transparency, consumer control and 
accountability.  The similarities among efforts depict the industry’s willingness to include 
the government's suggestions in the formation of their self-policing efforts and show that 
it may be possible for the two bodies to work harmoniously, rather than in opposition.   
     The inclusion of the CBBB as an enforcement arm, and the use of the FTC as a 
disciplinary body highlight the industry’s attempts to include the government in its efforts 
and display the Digital Advertising Alliance’s willingness to work collectively in the 
execution of its “Self-Regulatory Program for Online Behavioral Advertising.”  In fact, 
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the program embodies exactly what Rep. Boucher’s bill describes when he refers to “a 
universal opt-out program operated by self-regulatory bodies and monitored by the FTC” 
(Jenkins & Gadlin, July 19, 2010).  The program allows consumers to opt out of third-
party advertisements and refers companies not in compliance with program standards to 
the FTC.  It is worth letting such a program prove itself, before imposing further 
restraints on the industry. 
     The program, in its current form, represents a desirable compromise between 
government and industry by combining their efforts rather than giving one party final say 
over the other.  A further compromise could be the incorporation of the FTC’s Do Not 
Track proposal in the “Self-Regulatory Program for Online Behavioral Advertising.”  
While the program now offers consumers the ability to opt out of advertisements from a 
particular network, the inclusion of a Do Not Track tool would allow particularly 
concerned consumers to opt out of tracking by all advertisers.  This would further 
enhance the transparency of the industry as well as strengthen their cooperation with the 
government’s efforts.  It would also highlight some of the strongest efforts of both parties 
by including one the of the government’s most highly praised suggestions with the 
industry’s best efforts to date.  
     The implementation of a Do Not Track tool in the existing Digital Advertising 
Alliance program would essentially please consumers, government and the advertising 
industry.  Consumers, for example, would be provided with upfront, transparent 
information and the option of opting out of third party tracking.  The government would 
see the enforcement of its best regulatory suggestion and be given the authority to 
discipline companies not in compliance with regulation requirements.  Finally, the 
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advertising industry would maintain initial autonomy over its behavior and be able to 
continue developing and applying innovative new technologies without the limiting 
presence of strict rules and guidelines.  If, after a trial period, the self-regulatory efforts of 
the advertising industry prove ineffective, with companies routinely violating guidelines 
and consumers expressing similar levels of concern, it will be time to reexamine 
regulatory efforts and consider imposing a set of laws and government statutes to oversee 
behavioral advertising industry.  Until that time, industry and government should 
continue to work cooperatively in their efforts as they attempt to guard consumers and 
protect the interests of a still new industry practice. 
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